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for more theoretical and legislative interest. It is a pity that at least in Slovenia 
there was absolutely no step further made in this regard in the last decade. 
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CASTIGATION OF MINORS AS A CIRCUMSTANCE EXCLUDING 
ILLEGALITY (A COUNTERTYPE) 
Introductory remarks (the concept and the classification of the so 
called countertypes). Not in every case does the fulfilment of the statutory 
features of a forbidden act have to be the expression of the objective social 
harmfulness of the perpetrator’s behaviour. Sometimes circumstances excluding 
illegality (the so called countertypes) occur which lead to the exclusion of the 
social harmfulness.1 In other words, there are possible exception to the rule 
(implying the negative assessment) that a behaviour fulfilling the statutory 
features of a forbidden act is characterised by social harmfulness.2 According to 
W. Wolter, the author of the concept of countertype “By countertypes we 
understand those and only those circumstances which, even though the act 
fulfils the statutory features of an act forbidden by the statute under the threat of 
punishment, make that act not socially harmful (possibly it can be positive), and 
hence not illegal; so these circumstance legalise an act generally considered to 
be illegal”.3 Every countertype is the description of a human act and its specific 
feature is that it has no autonomous sense (i.e. alone, isolated from the type, it 
makes no sense4). A countertype may therefore function only in connection 
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with a certain type (or rather types) of a forbidden act.5 The range of individual 
countertypes is, of course, varied, yet each of them has to have some features of 
a generalising character. As no type constitutes a one-time concrete order (or 
interdiction), so no countertype can be perceived as an individual (isolated) case 
of the legality of an act. Naturally the construction of a type differs clearly from 
a countertype, since the latter has to contain the description of the conflict 
element of the situation, the occurrence of which enables it to work. 
The criminal law doctrine representatives distinguish relative countertypes 
(which exclude only the criminal illegality) or absolute ones (excluding all 
illegality); statutory (codified) ones and non-statutory (uncodified) ones, as well 
as general ones (referring to an unspecified number of types of forbidden acts) 
and special ones (referring to a specified, strict group of types – e.g. Article 213 
§ 2 of the Criminal Code).6 
The basic countertypes are described in Chapter II of the Criminal Code 
entitled “Exclusion of criminal responsibility”. One finds there: self-defence 
(Article 25), state of higher necessity (Article 26), acceptable risk (Article 27). 
Outside that chapter the Criminal Code recognises the following countertypes: 
the countertype of acceptable criticism (Article 213), acting in extreme need 
(Article 319). The countertype of artistic, collector or scientific activity (Article 
256 § 3 of the Criminal Code)7, the countertype of not reporting an offence 
(Article 240 § 2 of the Criminal Code)8 and the countertype of refusal to 
execute an order (Article 344 of the Criminal Code)9 are also mentioned in 
literature. One should also not forget the countertype described by the Civil 
Code – the so called legal self-help (Art. 343 § 2. Article 432 § 1, Article 461 
§ 2, Article 496, 671 § 2 of the Civil Code). The above catalogue is not a closed 
one since there are also the countertypes not regulated by statutes (and at most 
“rooted” in the statutes), known as non-statutory countertypes, such as: the 
consent of the victim, castigation of minors, sports risk, medical activities, 
termination of pregnancy, acting within one’s professional rights and 
obligations, custom. The following remarks will be devoted to castigation of 
minors. 
Particular remarks (concept, conditions and range of the functioning 
of the castigation of minors). By castigation one should understand causing 
harm in order to make another person aware of the reprehensibility of his 
behaviour so as to influence that person’s behaviour in the future.10 There may 
be different types of castigation: we can talk about physical castigation, but also 
about castigation by word or gesture, and even about a disapproving look. 
Formally taken, types of behaviour which should be taken into account as 
castigation fulfil the statutory features of an offence, e.g. infringement on 
bodily inviolability (Article 217 of the Criminal Code), enforcing a behaviour 
(Article 191 § 1 of the Criminal Code) – in the case of verbal castigation – 
insult (Article 216 of the Criminal Code)11. As far as physical castigation is 
concerned, its two basic forms can be distinguished. The first one is castigation 
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as an organised reaction, in the case of which the child is punished for its 
behaviour in a predictable time and place, the second one is castigation as a 
spontaneous reaction, performed immediately after the discovery of the 
misconduct. I. Andrejew recognises also a third form of castigation in which the 
elements of both spontaneity and some organisation may appear, which he 
labels as “minor correction” (e.g. a slap, as long as it does not involve hitting 
the face).12 One should not forget that castigation is associated with the issue, 
known in pedagogics and psychology, of applying the so called positive 
reinforcements (awards) and negative ones (punishments).13 It is stressed in 
psychology that the necessary condition for learning a given reaction is its 
positive reinforcement by satisfaction (i.e. reduction of some need of the 
organism). It is known that a punishment does not reduce any need, on the 
contrary – it strengthens it. It can be therefore assumed that the most effective 
method is to limit unwanted reactions while strengthening the wanted ones at 
the same time. Henceforth, if a child is forbidden to do something, one should 
at the same time show (inform) it, what it should do and performance of the 
wanted action should be reinforced (awarded). One could risk stating that a 
punishment, should it at all be effective, is such due to its informative function 
(what should be done to avoid the punishment and to receive the award). The 
effectiveness of punishment requires some other factors to be also taken into 
account, i.e. the attitude of the child to the source of punishment (i.e. to the 
punishing person) and acceptance by the child of the norms which are endorsed 
by the castigator.14 
There are no legal bases which would unequivocally permit the castigation 
of children. A certain point of reference can be found in the regulation of the 
statute of 25 February 1964 – Family and Guardianship Code (unified text: 
Journal of Laws 2019.2086): Article 92 (“A child remains under parental 
authority until its majority”) and Article 95 § 2 (“A child remaining under 
parental authority should be obedient to its parents”). One should notice, 
however, that the statute of 10 June 2010 on the modification of the statute on 
preventing family violence and some other statutes (Journal of Laws No 125, 
position 842) introduced in Poland the interdiction to apply physical 
punishment to children (Article 961: “Persons executing parental authority and 
persons who are guardians of minors are forbidden to apply physical 
punishments”).15 It seems that this amendment definitively makes the 
application of physical castigation of children illegal. It does not mean, of 
course, that the circumstance excluding illegality in the form of castigation of 
minors has stopped functioning (with the reservation, however, that it is 
inadmissible to apply the most radical form of castigation, i.e. physical 
castigation). Other (than physical) forms of castigation should be taken into 
account. It would be difficult to forbid the parents (and sometimes the 
guardians or educators) to correct minors, to force them to do their homework, 
to reasonably limit where, when and with whom they meet or at what time they 
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return or leave home. In the case of doing the above we may formally recognise 
the execution of the actus reus of the offences of insult, enforcing a behaviour 
or depriving of liberty. 
For castigation (other than physical) to be legal, the following conditions 
must be met: 
– castigation may be performed only by entitled persons (first of all parents 
enjoying their parental authority, and sometimes other persons, e.g. teachers, 
guardians), 
– castigation must be performed cum animocorrigendi (in order to 
improve), 
– castigation must be just (i.e. in the child’s consciousness it must be 
associated with its wrongful behaviour); 
– castigation must be moderate,16 
– castigation is possible until the children reach majority (i.e. as a rule – the 
age of 18). 
Trespassing the boundaries of castigation may imply responsibility for e.g. 
maltreatment (Article 207 of the Criminal Code), causing bodily injury (Article 
156, 157 of the Criminal Code). It is obvious that in the practical application of 
law there will be many cases of parents who may have problems because of 
spanking their child. It seems that in such (minor) cases it should be a rule to 
consider them as acts of inconspicuous degree of social harmfulness (and hence 
as not constituting offences). The introduction of the interdiction to physically 
castigate minors into the Family and Guardianship Code should be disapproved. 
Such an interdiction had already existed in fact and was expressed by other 
regulation of the Criminal Code (forbidding e.g. to infringe on bodily 
inviolability, to maltreat, to cause bodily harm). It is worth remembering that 
family relations are not easily accommodated with legal intervention, and if the 
state’s intention was to eliminate “spanking” from the repertory of parental 
educative methods, a decidedly better way was to choose widespread 
educational actions than introducing a legal interdiction (which shall not change 
the mentality and existing practice).17 
Closing remarks. Castigation of minors is one of the so called non-code 
countertypes (of great social importance). After the modification of the Family 
and Guardianship Code from 10 June 2010 the total interdiction to apply 
physical punishment to children was introduced. It does not mean, however, 
that the countertype of castigation of minors stopped existing, but only that its 
most radical form (physical punishment) can no longer be applied, while the 
other forms of castigation remain valid. It is, obviously, crucial that all the 
conditions for legality are met in every case (it must be performed by an 
entitled person, acting cum animocorrigendi; it must be just, moderate add 
applied only to persons who have not reached the age of 18). 
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PRZESTĘPSTWO DOPROWADZENIA DO UPRAWIANIA 
PROSTYTUCJI (ART. 203 K.K.) 
Wprowadzenie. Stosownie do art. 203 polskiego k.k. z 1997 r. kto 
przemocą, groźbą bezprawną, podstępem lub wyzyskując stosunek zależności 
albo krytyczne położenie, doprowadza inną osobę do uprawiania prostytucji, 
podlega karze pozbawienia wolności od roku do lat 10. Ten typ czynu 
zabronionego nie miał bezpośredniego odpowiednika ani w k.k. z 1932 r, ani 
też w k.k. z 1969 r. W k.k. z 1932 r (w art. 210) penalizowane było nakłanianie 
innej osoby do zawodowego oddawania się nierządowi (pod groźbą kary 
więzienia do lat 5 i grzywny)1; podobnie ujmował to art. 174 § 1 k.k. z 1969 r. 
(kto nakłania inna osobę do uprawiania nierządu, podlega karze pozbawienia 
wolności od roku do lat 10).2 
Pojęcie prostytutki i systemy prawne reglamentacji prostytucji. 
M. Jasińska definiuje prostytutkę jako osobę, która zaspokaja potrzeby 
seksualne przypadkowych partnerów w zamian za pieniądze albo inne dobra 
materialne i bez zaangażowania uczuciowego, z ograniczonym prawem wyboru 
klienta – partnera seksualnego.3 Natomiast według. M.Antoniszyna i A.Marka 
„prostytutką jest osoba, która stale lub dorywczo uprawia proceder polegający 
na świadczeniu usług seksualnych w dowolnej formie w zamian za korzyści 
materialne, które stanowią decydujący motyw jej działania.4”. W nauce 
wskazuje się, że zawodowe uprawianie prostytucji nie jest konieczne aby uznać 
daną osobę za prostytutkę; możliwa jest bowiem tzw. prostytucja 
okolicznościowa.5 Nie ulega wątpliwości to, ze prostytucję mogą uprawiać 
zarówno kobieta, jak i mężczyzna.6 Znane są cztery systemy prawne regulujące 
zjawisko prostytucji (prohibicyjny, reglamentacyjny, neoreglamentacyjny, 
